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The increasing accuracy of algorithms to predict values and preferences raises the possibility that 
artificial intelligence technology will be able to serve as a surrogate decision-maker for incapacitated 
patients.  Following Camillo Lamanna and Lauren Byrne, we call this technology the autonomy algorithm 
(AA).  Such an algorithm would mine medical research, health records, and social media data to predict 
patient treatment preferences.  The possibility of developing the AA raises the ethical question of 
whether the AA or a relative ought to serve as surrogate decision-maker in cases where the patient has 
not issued a medical power of attorney.  We argue that in such cases, and against the standard practice 
of vesting familial surrogates with decision making authority, the AA should have sole decision-making 
authority.  This is because the AA will likely be better at predicting what treatment option the patient 
would have chosen.  It would also be better at avoiding bias and, therefore, choosing in a more patient-
centered manner.  Furthermore, we argue that these considerations override any moral weight of the 
patient’s special relationship with their relatives.   
Introduction 
Experts in artificial intelligence (AI) claim that the exponential growth and development of AI “promises 
to change the landscape of medical practice” (Yu et al. 2018) This change will come with its own set of 
ethical questions, so it is crucial for bioethicists to anticipate the future integration of AI into medical 
practices.  The increasing accuracy of algorithms to predict personal values and preferences raises the 
possibility that artificial intelligence technology could, in the near future, be developed to serve as a 
possible surrogate decision-maker for incapacitated patients.  Following Camillo Lamanna and Lauren 
Byrne, we call this technology the autonomy algorithm (AA) (2018). Such an algorithm would mine 
medical research, electronic health records (EHR), sociodemographic data, and social network 
information to make predictions regarding patient medical preferences.   
This raises the following question: Should the AA or a relative serve as surrogate decision-maker?  We 
argue that the common principles employed to make decisions for incapacitated patients recommend 
that all relevant stakeholders should defer to the AA’s recommendation when the following conditions 
are met: (a) an adult patient without decision-making capacity has not issued a medical power of 
attorney, (b) relevant values and preferences can be inferred from their digital footprint and other data 
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sources, and (c) the patient lacks an advance directive specifying their treatment preferences. 1 
Stakeholders should defer to the AA because the AA will likely be better at predicting what treatment 
option the patient would have chosen and avoiding bias, which would aid in identifying a medical option 
that is more patient-centered.  Furthermore, we argue that these considerations override any moral 
weight given to the patient’s special relationship to their family.   
Some patients who meet the aforementioned conditions may have the preference that the AA not make 
recommendations on their behalf. In such cases we believe that the AA should recuse itself 
from identifying these patients' preferred treatments. It is worth noting, however, that at least one 
study suggests that most patients prefer that an algorithm be at least part of a shared decision-making 
process with surrogates and physicians (Wendler, et. al., 2016).  
In what follows we begin with an overview of how medical decisions ought to be made on behalf of 
incapacitated patents.  Next, we discuss the current status of AI in medicine and its ability to predict 
preferences, values, and personality traits.  We then discuss how an autonomy algorithm would function 
to predict incapacitated patients’ treatment preferences.  We then present our main argument in 
support of using the AA to make decisions for incapacitated patients.  Finally, we respond to a number 
of potential objections to our view.   
Before proceeding, we acknowledge that our argument may depend on the kind of incapacitated patient 
that is involved, including children. 2 For our purposes, we will not consider whether the AA should make 
decisions for patients – like young children – who have never had capacity.  It may be that parents have 
a special prerogative to direct the lives of their children that overrides the AA, but this issue is simply 
beyond the scope of our paper.  Our proposal applies only to patients who meet conditions a – c above 
and who were previously capacitated.3   
Surrogate Decision-Making  
It is common practice that the substituted judgment principle (SJP) and the best interest principle (BIS) 
should guide surrogate decision-making for incapacitated patients.4  According to the SJP, the surrogate 
ought to choose the option the patient would have chosen had she had capacity.5 By contrast, according 
 
1 Although we believe that the AA should have sole decision-making authority, we also believe that this authority is 
contingent on regulatory oversight. Moreover, we believe that the actual process of implementing the practice of 
AA deferral should proceed gradually. We discuss these issues later in our article.  
2 Other types of incapacitated patients include the intoxicated, the mentally ill, seniors with dementia, and patients 
with little to no consciousness.  
3 For non-capacitated persons who never previously had decision-making capacity, the AA would be unable to 
apply the substituted judgment standard. The same, of course, is true of human surrogates. 
4 Many states designate a priority of surrogate decision-makers (typically with spouses given top priority, parents 
second, adult children third, etc.) in the absence of an advance directive and that such surrogates should make 
decisions based on these principles.   However, these principles apply even when the patient has established an 
advance directive, as advance directives cannot specify a course of action for all possible scenarios.  As Allen 
Buchanan and Dan Brock state, “[s]ince instructional advance directives can neither cover every contingency nor 
be fully self-explanatory, someone must be identified as having principal responsibility for interpreting and 
applying the instructional advance directive as choices arise” (135, 1989).   
5 The conventional view is that the SJP ensures that the patient’s autonomy is respected.  Others argue that the 
principle is responding to the patient’s authenticity or dignity (Brudney, 2009).  It makes no difference for our 
argument what the moral basis of the SJP is.  All that matters for our purposes is that the principle itself is correct. 
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to the BIS, the surrogate should choose what would be in the patient’s best interest.6 It is commonly 
held that the SJP should take priority over the BIS, that the latter only goes into effect if the patient’s 
preferences are unknown (Beauchamp and Childress, 2001).  We will only appeal to the SJP to make our 
case, since we argue that the AA would make recommendations based on the patient’s known 
preferences. 
The primary moral reason for appointing a surrogate decision-maker is that they are best able to fulfill 
the SJP. Indeed, most states have laws that identify a prioritized list of surrogate decision-makers that 
give priority to those closest to the patient such as their spouse, adult child, or parent.7  There are at 
least two moral reasons in favor of these laws.  First, the familial surrogate presumably knows the 
patient better than the healthcare professionals caring for them (Beauchamp and Brock, 136, 2001).  
This enables the surrogate to choose options that the patient themself would have chosen if 
capacitated. As Daniel Brudney writes, “We want the surrogate to make the decision because we believe 
that she has a relevant epistemological advantage over anyone else on the scene.  If and when she has 
no such advantage…then there might not be sufficient reason to let her be the decision-maker” (38, 
2009). Second, the intimate – such as a close relative or friend – is presumed to be motivated to act on 
the patient’s behalf.8   
This rationale for appointing intimates to make decisions for incapacitated patients suggest two criteria 
for identifying a surrogate: The Criteria of Epistemic Advantage and the Criteria of Fidelity.  The former 
claims that whoever has the highest epistemic advantage – whoever knows the patient best – should be 
designated as surrogate decision-maker.  The latter claims that the surrogate decision-maker should be 
motivated to act on behalf of the patient’s preferences rather than, say, the surrogate’s own 
preferences.  We return to these criteria below.  
The Current Status of Artificial Intelligence 
Current research in artificial intelligence focuses on machine learning algorithms that identify patterns 
from large amounts of data (Yu et al., 2018).  This kind of AI already plays important roles in decision-
making.  For example, in 2014 a venture capital firm appointed an algorithm named Vital to its board of 
directors.9  It is also now common for algorithms to aid in investment decisions. 
In their overview of artificial intelligence in healthcare, K. H. Yu and colleagues discuss how “AI systems 
have specialist-level performance in medical diagnostic tasks, can better predict patient prognosis than 
clinicians, and can assist in surgical interventions” (2018). For example, in a recent experiment, a deep-
learning algorithm outperformed dermatologists in diagnosing skin malignancy (Esteva, et al. 2017).  
Additionally, an AI system has been developed that can diagnose diabetic retinopathy just as well as 
 
6 See Allen Buchanan and Dan Brock (1989, 31-34).    
7 We say primary because the BIS is the other, secondary, ground for appointing surrogates. Again, our focus is 
only on the SJP.  
8 Of course, the rationale for appointing intimates is also partly practical: intimates are usually more readily 
available to responsibility make choices for the patient. 
9 See “Algorithm Appointed Board Director,” BBC News, May 16, 2014, www.bbc.com/news/technology-27426942; 
and Sophie Brown, “Could Computers Take Over the Boardroom?,” CNN Business, October 1, 
2014, www.cnn.com/2014/09/30/business/computers-ceo-boardroom-robot-boss/index.html. 
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physicians (Gulshan 2016). And it has been reported that IBM’s AI ‘Watson’ has a success rate of 90% in 
diagnosing lung cancer, while physicians’ diagnostic success rate is only 50%.10 
In addition to diagnostic tasks, algorithms are also able to predict Big Five personality traits: openness, 
conscientiousness, extraversion, agreeableness and neuroticism.  A meta-analysis showed "that 
predictive power of digital footprints over [Big Five] personality traits is in line with the standard 
"correlational upper-limit" for behavior to predict personality” (Azucar, et. al. 2018).11 12   
Furthermore, one study found that Facebook likes “can be used to automatically and accurately predict 
a range of highly sensitive personal attributes including: sexual orientation, ethnicity, religious and 
political views, personality traits, intelligence, happiness, use of addictive substances, parental 
separation, age, and gender” (Kosinski et al., 2013). Considering that the data input in this study was 
only Facebook likes, adding additional factors of a digital footprint is highly likely to increase the 
accuracy and scope of AI’s predictive power. Other studies attest to this power (Gou, et al. 2014; Yarkoni 
2010; Chen et al. 2014; Golbeck et al. 2011; Warshaw et al. 2015; Marengo, D and Settanni, M, 2019).   
So far, we have shown that AI is able to predict many aspects of one’s identity and we suspect that 
prediction capacity will only increase over time.  But what about AI’s potential to predict medical 
preferences in particular? There is some evidence of this potential.  One study suggests that Big Five 
“personality traits are associated with specific health care preferences” related to end-of-life care 
among men with prostate cancer (Lattie, et al). For instance, the study showed that “neuroticism was 
associated with a lower preference for palliative care, whereas agreeableness was linked to a lower 
preference for life support” (Lattie, et al). This provides some evidence to believe that AI’s potential to 
predict medical preferences is real.  
Given that AI is able to predict Big Five personality traits based on social media data, and that there are 
strong associations between these traits and certain medical preferences, future AI, with appropriate 
data, will likely be able to predict medical preferences for incapacitated persons.  While speculative, we 
believe that AI’s ability to identify additional aspects of a person’s identity will increase its ability to 
accurately predict medical preferences.   
How the Autonomy Algorithm Would Work 
According to Camillo Lamanna and Lauren Byrne, the AA is a computational process that “takes data 
about patients as input and derives a confidence estimate for a particular patient’s predicted health 
care-related decision as output” (2018). Specifically, the algorithm would draw on social network data to 
predict what the patient would choose if they had capacity, as well as sociodemographic data such as 
age, gender, and education.  Annette Rid and David Wendler have documented how these kinds of 
sociodemographic factors can influence treatment preferences (2014).   In addition, the AA would mine 
the patient’s EHR, population-wide EHRs, and the vast reservoir of medical research to predict which 
treatment options would align with the patient’s substituted judgment.  
Shahla Siddiqui and Voo Teck Chuan distinguish between two kinds of social networking data that could 
help inform the algorithm: “One type is a specific expression of a preference regarding a particular 
 
10 https://www.wired.co.uk/article/ibm-watson-medical-doctor (accessed 5/9/2019) 
11 We thank an anonymous reviewer for pointing out this study. 
12 Relatedly, another study showed that mining digital footprint data “can effectively predict consumers decision-
making styles” (Chen Y. J. et. al.)  
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treatment or scenario.  Another would be a general expression that discerns a person’s life outlook and 
values” (2018).  This data could be drawn from Facebook likes, comments on social media platforms, 
time spent watching videos on certain topics, link navigation, and other indicators of preference and 
personality traits. 
We should note that it is already not uncommon to use social media data to inform important legal 
decisions.  As Jessica Berg remarks, “Social media have been used in family law (e.g. divorce and child 
custody), employment law, and criminal law (to sow criminal behavior and juror misconduct).  Courts 
are unlikely to reject the use of social media in surrogate decision-making cases” (2012).  Additionally, it 
is not uncommon for clinicians to search their patient’s social media data to aid in determining 
treatment (Jent et al. 2011).  Incorporating social media data into the decision-making process – and so 
into the input of an algorithm – would therefore be extending precedent.  Indeed, using information 
from social media to make decisions for incapacitated patients will likely become even more prevalent 
and can be “especially useful in understanding an incapacitated person’s wishes” (Jent et al. 2011).     
Some may worry that a person’s online presence may not accurately portray their true self, given 
peoples’ apparent propensity to present an overly flattering view of themselves.  There is evidence, 
however, that this concern is misguided. One study supports the view that “people use OSNs [online 
social networks] to communicate their real personality;” the study also found “no evidence of self-
idealization” (Back, et al. 2010).  Other studies corroborate this claim (Turkle 1997; Vazire and Gosling 
2004).  
Argument for the Autonomy Algorithm 
 
The discussion so far leads us to three main considerations that attest to the AA’s ability to satisfy the 
Criterion of Epistemic Advantage.  First, studies have shown that surrogates predict patients’ 
preferences no better than the base-rate (Smucker et. al 2000; Houts 2002; Shalowitz et. al., 2007). If 
the AA can outperform the base-rate, then it will likely predict patient preferences more accurately than 
intimates.  The studies we mentioned earlier, which show that algorithms are able to derive accurate 
personality traits and values from a person’s digital footprint, suggest that the AA would likely meet this 
condition.     
Second, one recent study suggests that an algorithm’s predictive accuracy can exceed that of intimates. 
This study found that an algorithm, based on Facebook ‘likes’, predicted aspects of a person’s 
personality better than that person’s friends and family (Youyou et al. 2015).  The algorithm required 
300 likes to outperform a spouse’s prediction, 150 likes to outperform family members, and seventy 
likes to outperform friends. Since preferences and personality are closely tied, these studies suggest that 
an algorithm is likely to generally predict preferences better than intimates.   
Third, surrogate decision-makers are notoriously bad at choosing an option that the patient would 
choose.  A meta-review of sixteen studies found that surrogates are able to predict patients’ medical 
preferences with sixty-eight percent accuracy (Shalowitz et al. 2006). Another study showed this rate to 
be sixty-three percent (Barrio-Cantalejo et al. 2009). Indeed, many studies have suggested that 
surrogates generally fare poorly in accurately predicting the decisions the patient would make (Pope 
2010). These studies also attest to the AA’s likely epistemic advantage.  
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What about the Criterion of Fidelity, the criterion that states that surrogates should be motivated to act 
solely on the basis of patients’ preferences? Would the AA satisfy this criterion? It is likely that the AA 
will generally satisfy the Criterion of Fidelity better than intimates.  A number of considerations, 
advanced by Thaddeus Pope, support this claim.  First, “surrogates frequently do not understand the 
clinical status of the patients whom they represent;” second, “many surrogates have clinically 
diagnosable conditions such as stress, depression, and anxiety;” third, surrogates often have difficulty 
distinguishing their preferences from the patient’s preferences (2010; Marks and Arkes 2008).  Since the 
AA is not vulnerable to these psychological shortcomings, it is likely it would more reliably decide in 
accordance with the patient’s preferences.   
We have shown that there are strong reasons to believe that the AA would better satisfy the Criteria of 
Epistemic Advantage and Fidelity than intimates.  Thus, based on the SJP, decision-makers should defer 
to the AA’s treatment recommendation. 
In addition to satisfying the SJP better than intimates, the AA would also relieve family and other proxies 
– such as physicians – of the burden of identifying the patient’s treatment preferences, which can often 
be stressful (Rid and Wendler 2014).  It may even deliver economic benefits by preventing treatments 
that patients would prefer to avoid. 
Objections  
In this section we address a number of potential objections to our view. The first objection, inspired by 
Allen Buchannan and Dan Brock’s influential theory of surrogate decision-making, is that a patient’s 
family has the right to make medical decisions on the patient’s behalf on account of their special 
relationship to the patient, and that this right overrides all non-familial claims to make decisions on the 
patient’s behalf. Mainly two considerations support this objection: (1) families typically have greater 
knowledge of the patient’s values and are more concerned with the patient’s good than others. 
Furthermore, (2) because all of us have a strong interest in intimate relationships, overriding the familial 
surrogate’s right to make medical decisions is impermissible (Buchanan and Brock 136-7, 1989). 
Let us respond to these considerations. In response to (1): We agree that family members typically know 
more about their loved one’s values and that they are usually more concerned with their best interests 
than others are. Thus, we agree with consideration (1) above. But we disagree with what it is meant to 
show. For in comparison with the AA, which has superior epistemic advantage compared to the patient’s 
family, we believe that the family’s claim to make decisions based on their epistemic position is 
undermined.  
Consideration (2), again, is the idea that we should be reluctant to interfere with the family since we all 
have an interest in forming intimate relationships. In response:  we believe that the loss in value of not 
deferring to a family member’s decision would be substantially outweighed by the value gain in 
promoting the patient’s autonomy via the AA. Additionally, if deferring to an AA undermines the value 
of special relationships, and this is a strong enough reason to not defer to the AA, then presumably it 
would also be a reason strong enough to override patients’ autonomous choices when they undermine 
this value.  This, however, is absurd and, so, by parity of reasoning we should reject this consideration.  
Note that the absurdity is evident regardless of whether the patient is capacitated or not; it is obvious 
insofar as overriding the patient’s autonomy, based on familial considerations, is clearly unacceptable.   
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We suspect that to the extent that this defense of the family’s right to make medical decisions seems 
plausible, it is due to the fact that we ignore the substantial epistemic gains the AA will offer. This is 
understandable, after all, simply because we are only beginning to understand how artificial intelligence 
will change the world. Nevertheless, the standard justification for the presumption in favor of familial 
autonomy that we discussed above is simply less persuasive in light of the AA’s epistemic advantage.  
Another point here is relevant: We are highly suspicious that familial independence would be 
significantly undermined by the AA. After all, many of the decisions previously reserved for families – 
about, for example, what kind of education children should receive or who should make reproductive 
choices – we now correctly believe should reside, at least partly if not completely, with others. For 
example, in regard to education, we now correctly believe that the state should require that children 
have at least basic mathematical knowledge and critical thinking skills to prepare them for a life in a 
pluralistic democratic society. We now also correctly believe that those who are capable of giving birth 
should at least have the primary say in whether or not to do so. And yet, in spite of these losses to 
familial independence, few of us think the family’s autonomy has been substantially curtailed (or, if we 
do, most of think this curtailment is justified). Instead, we think the family has simply been rebalanced in 
favor of other values, such as women’s equality and children’s future autonomy.  
The second objection to our view is that it would be dehumanizing.  As Camillo Lamanna and Lauren 
Byrne write, “We submit that it is the process of making a decision that is humanizing and autonomy 
affirming.  Therefore, it would be dehumanizing to automate this process and defer to algorithmic 
outputs as a matter of course” (Lamanna and Byrne, 908).  In reply to this objection, a number of points 
are in order. First, this appeal to dehumanization needs to be articulated.  A person is dehumanized 
when that individual is regarded in such a way that removes the qualities that ground their worth as a 
person, such as their agency.  We do not think that any individual would be dehumanized in this manner 
by deferring to an AA’s decision.  While the deliberative role – which is part of agency – is removed from 
the family, our thesis does not entail that a family member’s deliberative capacity would be 
undermined.  Part of one’s humanity is the capacity for agency and deliberation.  Deferring to the AA 
would not undermine this capacity just as deferring to the next of kin does not undermine the 
deliberative capacity of a more distant family member who may want to be part of the deliberative 
process.  Our thesis, therefore, does not threaten the humanity of the patient’s intimates.   
Perhaps the worry is not that any individual would be dehumanized, but rather that deferring to the AA 
would dehumanize the context of medical decision-making by removing the ‘humanity’ from it.  The 
argument for this worry might be something like the following: In the medical decision-making context, 
we express our humanity through a process of interpersonal deliberation.  But deferring to an algorithm 
would prevent interpersonal deliberation by replacing a human-oriented process – in this case decision-
making – with a tech-oriented process. Therefore, designating the AA would fail to express our humanity 
in the medical decision-making context.   
In response, even if deferring to the AA is dehumanizing in this sense, we believe that the benefit of the 
AA outweighs the cost. After all, modern medicine avails itself of every available technology to diagnose 
and treat patients.  These technologies might remove some notion of humanity from the decision-
making context, yet they are clearly warranted.  Moreover, the loss of humanity is likely more than 
made up for by the gain of bringing the patient’s values and preferences more accurately into the 
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decision-making process. This gain could also easily be characterized by the same notion of humanity at 
work in the objection.  
The third objection alleges that the AA would be subject to algorithmic bias.13 Indeed there have been 
many cases in which an algorithm’s output is biased against certain groups. For example, bias against 
African Americans has been detected in algorithms designed to predict recidivism.14 In response, we 
acknowledge that the AA would not be immune to bias.  We believe, however, that this concern does 
not undermine our proposal.  There is already much work being done on identifying and preventing 
algorithmic bias (Courtland, 2018). This work should be implemented when developing the AA and its 
team of developers should include an algorithmic bias specialist.  Moreover, once the AA is developed, it 
should be periodically audited by an independent board to detect for any bias.  It is worth emphasizing 
that the AA would analyze personal data from social media to detect preferences in addition to 
preference correlations in demographic data.  This personalized approach may be able to help prevent 
algorithmic bias, by, for example, training the AA to identify the patient’s preferences by examining their 
social media comments about end-of-life issues (Berg, 2012). 
It is also worth noting that, in addition to the AA itself, the institutions that develop the AA might 
contribute to algorithmic bias.  For example, for-profit institutions could nudge the algorithm to 
recommend more expensive treatment options, even if the patient would not prefer them.  We believe 




In this paper we have argued that the autonomy algorithm should make decisions for incapacitated 
patients rather than their family members. This recommendation is at odds with the current and widely 
shared practice of deferring to family. In an effort to transition us away from this practice to our 
recommended one in favor of the AA, we believe it is wise that the AA be developed and tested in 
clinical trials in an effort to build public trust in the algorithm.  A single study has already suggested that 
most people would want such an algorithm to be incorporated into the decision-making process if they 
were incapacitated (Wendler et al. 2016).  Once public trust is built, there should be a policy in which, as 
a default, the AA act as the surrogate for patients who have not designated a medical power of attorney. 
Importantly, however, we believe that patients should have the right to opt out of this default policy, for 
instance in their advance directive.   
In conclusion, although we have argued for vesting the AA with sole decision-making authority, we also 
believe that transitioning to our AA-centric proposal should be a gradual process. In an effort to arrive at 
 
13 We thank three anonymous reviewers for pressing us to address this issue.  
14 https://www.propublica.org/article/machine-bias-risk-assessments-in-criminal-sentencing 
15 Relatedly, the algorithm should be as transparent as possible. For example, it would be reasonable for family 
members to inquire about how the AA made its recommendation. Families who disagree with the AA’s 
recommendation would need to provide evidence for their view. Moreover, our proposal to use AA over families is 
consistent with employing the AA in this fashion only after an extensive period of public commentary and 
involvement.  Transparency is also important for building public trust in the AA.  While deep learning systems are 
notorious for being ‘black boxes,’ work is being done on making its processes explainable (Montavon, et. al.).  We 
thank an anonymous reviewer for raising these issues. 
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our AA-centric proposal, the AA should initially be incorporated into the shared, medical decision-
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